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The United States wields disproportionate global influence in terms of carbon dioxide
emissions and international climate policy. This makes it an especially important context in
which to examine the interplay among social, psychological, and political factors in shaping
attitudes and behaviors related to climate change. In this article, we review the emerging
literature addressing the liberal-conservative divide in the U.S. with respect to thought,
communication, and action concerning climate change. Because of its theoretical and
practical significance, we focus on the motivational basis for skepticism and inaction on
the part of some, including “top-down” institutional forces, such as corporate strategy, and
“bottom-up” psychological factors, such as ego, group, and system justification. Although
more research is needed to elucidate fully the social, cognitive, and motivational bases of
environmental attitudes and behavior, a great deal has been learned in just a few years by
focusing on specific ideological factors in addition to general psychological principles.
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INTRODUCTION
The scientific community exhibits widespread agreement about
anthropogenic climate change and the need to reduce green-
house gas emissions (Anderegg et al., 2010). For a number
of reasons, including the intergenerational nature of climate
change policy, whereby sacrifices made today will not yield div-
idends for decades to come (Schelling, 1995; Bazerman, 2006;
Jacquet et al., 2013), greenhouse gas reductions will not be
accomplished easily. Despite the fact that obstacles are universal,
there is considerable variation in the degree to which individual
and corporate actors (including nation-states) have sought to
mitigate fossil fuel use—a fact that should, and does, interest
social scientists.
Due to its disproportionate global influence in terms of carbon
dioxide emissions (second only to China) as well as its role in
affecting international climate policy, the U.S. stands out as an
especially important context in which to examine social, psy-
chological, and political dynamics. In 2009, a task force of the
American Psychological Association (APA) identified numerous
reasons for the public’s lack of urgency on the issue, including
old habits, feelings of personal insignificance, uncertainty about
the severity of climate changes, mistrust of information, the belief
that the costs of climate change will occur later in the future
than scientists expect, and high rates of denial and skepticism
(Swim et al., 2010). Indeed, skepticism about climate change is
higher in the U.S. than in other countries (Anderegg et al., 2010;
Poortinga et al., 2011; Engels et al., 2013)—and this fact itself
requires deeper explanation. It seems especially pertinent that
denial and skepticism are not uniformly distributed across the
political landscape; conservatives express greater skepticism about
climate change and more opposition to climate-related policies
than liberals (e.g., Weber and Stern, 2011; Liu et al., 2014).
In the APA report, Swim et al. (2010) cited just two stud-
ies addressing the ideological divide over climate change policy
(Dunlap and McCright, 2008; Hardisty et al., 2010). Since that
time, a literature has emerged to analyze liberal-conservative
differences in climate-related attitudes and behaviors, including
studies that have highlighted motivational factors that help to
explain the ideological divide and its implications for political
action (or inaction) when it comes to climate change. Jost et al.
(2009) proposed that ideological outcomes are typically the joint
product of “top-down” elite-driven forms of communication (i.e.,
the discursive superstructure) and “bottom-up” psychological
factors that make citizens more or less receptive to those forms
of communication (i.e., the motivational substructure). In an
effort to integrate “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches, we
review recent research on the U.S. ideological divide that is
focused specifically on climate change (rather than environmental
concerns more broadly, but see, e.g., Dunlap et al., 2001; Xiao and
McCright, 2007; Feygina et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2014).
THE IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE: PUBLIC OPINION DATA
Since the 1980s, U.S. political leaders have been resistant—
symbolically and operationally—to domestic action and
international cooperation on climate change (Jamieson, 2014).
Polarization among the American public has been on the rise
since the 1990s (Guber, 2013). In a 2010 Gallup survey of
1,014 adults in the U.S., 74% of liberals agreed that “effects of
global warming are already occurring,” whereas only 30% of
conservatives concurred (Jones, 2010). Public opinion surveys of
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1,024 Americans in 2012 revealed that 42% contend that climate
change claims are “generally exaggerated” and that political
conservatives are more skeptical of climate change than liberals
(Saad, 2012). Even among Republicans, there appears to be an
ideological split: a survey of 1,504 Americans in October 2013
found that 61% of non-Tea Party Republicans believe that there
is solid evidence of global warming, as compared to only 25% of
Tea Party Republicans (Pew Research Center, 2013).
While some surveys suggest broad support for certain climate
change-related policies (e.g., tax breaks for renewable energies;
Krosnick and MacInnis, 2013), other studies reveal pervasive
ideological cleavages. In a survey of 209 Pittsburgh residents
concerning fossil fuel consumption, Republicans were 4.5 times
and Independents were 4.2 times more likely than Democrats to
reject regulations proposed to limit SUVs and trucks (Attari et al.,
2009). Gromet et al. (2013) surveyed 657 U.S. residents and found
that people who identified themselves as politically conservative
were less supportive of investment in energy-efficient technology
than those who were more liberal. Based on a survey of 375 res-
idents from Michigan, Bidwell (2013) concluded that opposition
to commercial wind farms was “fueled by conservatism.”
Natural field experiments also highlight the extent of ideolog-
ical division. Providing households—which account for approx-
imately 38% of U.S. total emissions (Dietz et al., 2009)—weekly
or monthly feedback about their home energy use (compared to
that of their neighbors) can lower overall energy consumption
(Schultz et al., 2007). Costa and Kahn (2013) analyzed data from
81,722 homes (48,058 of which were in a control group) over
the course of nearly 3 years and connected homeowners with
voter registration records (i.e., party affiliation). Compared to
Democrats, Republicans were more likely to opt out of the energy
program, less likely to indicate that they liked the home energy
reports and found them useful, and were less likely to reduce their
energy consumption during the course of the intervention.
“TOP-DOWN” FACTORS: INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS ON
COMMUNICATION AND DISCOURSE
Evidence suggests that there are clear “top-down” institutional
forces at work when it comes to skepticism about climate
change and political acquiescence, and that these forces exacerbate
the ideological divide (see Figure 1). Sociologists Dunlap and
McCright (2011) link the rise of climate change denial to corpo-
rate and right-wing strategists, such as Richard Mellon Scaife and
the Koch brothers (who have given at least $48 million—half of
that since 2005—to groups that actively deny global warming).
Scholars and investigative journalists have become increasingly
concerned about the historical role of corporations and politicians
in deceiving the public about the risks of a wide range of behaviors
associated with tobacco use, pollution, and climate change (e.g.,
Michaels, 2008; Oreskes and Conway, 2010).
Evidence from cross-national studies confirms that informa-
tion communicated in the U.S. is distinct from what is commu-
nicated in the rest of the world. Bailey et al. (2014) compared
climate change coverage in 2001 and 2007 in U.S. (New York
Times andWall Street Journal) and Spanish newspapers (ElMundo
and El Pais) and found that U.S. newspapers used twice as
much “hedging” language—words that suggest uncertainty (e.g.,
FIGURE 1 | Contributions of top-down and bottom-up influences to the
ideological divide over climate change.
“inaccurate” or “speculative”). An analysis of 2,064 print media
articles spanning six countries (Brazil, China, France, India, U.K.,
and the U.S.) from November 2009 to February 2010 revealed
that the U.S. had the highest proportion of articles—one-third—
expressing skeptical positions about climate change (Painter and
Ashe, 2012).
Within the U.S., print media between 1998 and 2002 expressed
more uncertainty about climate change than scientists registered
(Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004). Content analysis of media in subse-
quent years has underscored high variability among news outlets.
Studies comparing cable news television channels (i.e., Fox News,
CNN, and MSNBC) demonstrated that Fox News has emphasized
scientific uncertainty more than other networks and has focused
more on stories that question the existence of human-caused
climate change (Feldman et al., 2012). Elsasser and Dunlap (2013)
analyzed 203 opinion editorials written by 80 U.S. conservative
columnists published between 2007 and 2010 and found that all of
them expressed doubts about climate change and/or climate sci-
ence. Hmielowski et al. (2014) performed longitudinal research,
surveying 2,497 U.S. residents in the fall of 2008 and 1,036 in a
follow-up survey in the spring of 2011. The researchers discovered
that the more individuals reported using conservative media, the
less certain they were that climate change was real. Moreover,
conservative media use was negatively associated with trust in
science over time, suggesting one powerful way in which mass
media influences beliefs.
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES IN PROCESSING “TOP-DOWN”
INFORMATION
Several studies have investigated the ways in which “top-down”
forms of elite communication (and framing) interact with
“bottom-up” factors such as the ideological inclinations of the
audience. This work suggests that exposure to the same informa-
tion can produce divergent effects—as a function of the message
recipient’s political orientation—when it comes to attitudes about
climate change. For example, an ideological divide was readily
apparent in response to the 2007 report of the Intergovernmental
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Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Budescu et al. (2012) asked
556 Americans to interpret the report’s use of words (rather than
numerical percentages) to describe risk probabilities. Overall,
respondents underestimated the problem of climate change as
characterized in the report. For instance, the phrase “very likely,”
which was intended to convey a probability of greater than 90% in
statements such as “it is very likely that hot extremes, heat waves,
and heavy precipitation events will continue to become more
frequent,” was interpreted, on average, as suggesting a 62% likeli-
hood. The underestimation effect was especially dramatic among
political conservatives, who interpreted “very likely” as reflecting
a probability of approximately 50%. A web experiment involving
400 Americans revealed that for conservatives the phrase “global
warming” was associated with certain outcomes (such as ris-
ing temperatures and melting ice), whereas the phrase “climate
change” was not; for liberals, there were no such differences in
association (Schuldt and Roh, 2014).
Hardisty et al. (2010) studied 337 Americans to determine
the effects of framing an environmental cost as a “tax” or an
“offset” when it came to the (hypothetical) purchase of an airline
ticket that included a surcharge for carbon dioxide emissions.
Participants evaluated a regular ticket and a more expensive ticket
similarly when the costlier ticket was framed as including an
“offset,” but Republicans and Independents were significantly less
approving of the costlier ticket when it included a “tax.” Only
23% of Republicans selected the more expensive option with the
environmental “tax,” as compared to 56% of Republicans who
selected the same ticket when it contained an “offset.” (Most
Democrats were supportive of the surcharge regardless of whether
it was described as an “offset” or “tax”).
Gromet et al. (2013) provided participants with $2 and asked
them to purchase (and take home) one of two light bulbs—
either an incandescent bulb or a compact fluorescent light (CFL)
bulb, which is considered a more environmentally friendly choice.
All participants were given information about the advantages of
purchasing CFLs over incandescent bulbs, such as energy and cost
savings as well as a longer lifespan. When experimenters made
both the CFL and incandescent bulbs the same price ($0.50),
nearly all participants (of all political stripes) purchased the CFL,
regardless of whether it was explicitly labeled as “good for the
environment” or left unlabeled. When the CFL was priced at three
times that of the incandescent bulb (which reflects current pricing
in the U.S.), conservatives and moderates were less likely to pur-
chase the CFL when it was labeled as “good for the environment”
than when it was not. Liberals showed no such difference. These
findings suggest that more conservative individuals may forgo
future cost savings to avoid projecting the image of an environ-
mentally concerned citizen. Sociologists doing ethnographic work
have similarly concluded that describing renewable technologies
such as solar energy as “green” appears to limit the adoption of
these products among political conservatives (Schelly, 2014).
“BOTTOM-UP” FACTORS: EGO, GROUP, AND SYSTEM
JUSTIFICATION MOTIVATION
Why would exposure to the same information elicit divergent
responses from liberals and conservatives? Recent work at the
intersection of sociology, psychology, and political science has
emphasized the role of “motivated reasoning” (e.g., Taber and
Lodge, 2006). It may be useful to distinguish among three motives
that can shape the processing of scientific (and other) informa-
tion, namely (a) ego (or self) justification, (b) group justification,
and (c) system justification (Jost et al., 2013).
For over 30 years, researchers have understood that indi-
viduals engage in “biased assimilation,” so that they readily
absorb new information that upholds the validity of their pre-
existing beliefs and opinions while resisting new information that
might challenge them (e.g., Lord et al., 1979; Ditto and Lopez,
1992). With respect to controversial political issues, Taber and
Lodge (2006) demonstrated that citizens often exhibit “moti-
vated skepticism”—using double standards to judge attitudinally
incongruent arguments as weaker than attitudinally congruent
arguments. This phenomenon might help to explain why respon-
dents to Gallup surveys in 1990, 2000, and 2010 who felt that
they understood the issue of climate change well were found to
be more rather than less polarized in terms of environmental
concern (Guber, 2013). Such ego-defensive tendencies, which are
consistent with Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory,
serve the goal of preserving the individual’s self-esteem, insofar
as it is easier to persist in the assumption that one’s opinions are
correct.
In many cases, it may be difficult to disentangle ego and group
justification motives for processing information in a selective or
distortive manner. This is because many cherished beliefs are
linked to membership in a social group (Tajfel and Turner, 1986)
or political party (Cohen, 2003) or cultural background (Kahan
et al., 2012; Kahan, 2013). Thus, an experiment conducted by Hart
and Nisbet (2012) demonstrated that exposure to scientific infor-
mation increased support for climate mitigation policies among
Democrats, whereas exposure to the same information decreased
support among Republicans. Another experiment (conducted
in Australia) revealed that increasing the cognitive salience of
political identification caused “right-wing” individuals to express
more skepticism about climate change (Unsworth and Field-
ing, 2014). Kahan et al. (2012) investigated the climate change
attitudes of 1,540 U.S. citizens and observed that greater levels
of scientific and mathematical competence predicted increased
polarization, suggesting that individuals may have been using
their cognitive resources to bolster their own pre-existing opin-
ions or those of their political party rather than engaging in a
process of learning and updating on the basis of exposure to new
information.
According to system justification theory, people are not only
motivated to defend and bolster the interests and esteem of their
personal self-concept and the social groups to which they belong;
they are also motivated to defend and bolster aspects of the social,
economic, and political systems on which they depend (Jost et al.,
2004). This motivation, which is more explicitly ideological than
ego or group justification motivation, tends to favor conservative
ways of thinking and behaving, insofar as it activates the goal
to justify the status quo. At the same time, there are impor-
tant situational and dispositional sources of variability in the
strength of system justification motivation. Some individuals, for
instance, are chronically higher than others in psychological needs
to reduce uncertainty and threat, and they are generally more
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driven to maintain pre-existing institutions, traditions, and social
arrangements (e.g., Jost et al., 2009; Hennes et al., 2012).
Studies show that conservatives are indeed more strongly
motivated by system justification concerns (e.g., Jost et al., 2008;
Vainio et al., 2014) and that ideological differences in economic
system justification help to explain why conservatives are more
skeptical about climate change and less supportive of environ-
mental action, in comparison with liberals and moderates (Fey-
gina et al., 2010; Campbell and Kay, 2014; Leviston and Walker,
2014). Consistent with these results, Lewandowsky et al. (2013)
surveyed 1,377 visitors to climate blogs and observed that rejec-
tion of climate science was predicted by endorsement of free
market ideology.
Likewise, nationally representative surveys conducted in Aus-
tralia demonstrated that system justification in the economic
domain was negatively associated with support for carbon pricing
and other pro-environmental initiatives. Economic system jus-
tification was also associated with decreased moral engagement
concerning environmental issues and—consistent with the “pal-
liative function” of system justification—decreased negative affect
concerning climate change (Leviston and Walker, 2014).
A study of university students in Finland revealed that percep-
tions of climate change as a threat to the national system and
right-wing orientation predicted system justification in general
as well as justification of the food distribution system in Fin-
land. System justification, in turn, was associated with denial
of anthropogenic climate change, decreased knowledge about
climate-friendly food choices, and a decreased willingness to
make climate-friendly food choices (Vainio et al., 2014).
Hennes et al. (2014) demonstrated that when system justifi-
cation motivation was temporarily activated, participants exhib-
ited biased memory for scientific information and greater skep-
ticism about climate change. More specifically, when partic-
ipants were made to feel especially dependent on the social
and economic system, they were prone to underestimate the
proportion of carbon emissions that were caused by human
activity (as reported in a newspaper article they had read ear-
lier in the session). It is worth emphasizing that the mem-
ory biases elicited by system justification motivation tended to
minimize problems associated with climate change and exon-
erate the overarching socioeconomic system. Thus, an addi-
tional (and often underappreciated) factor contributing to moti-
vated reasoning about climate change is system justification
motivation.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have reviewed recent work in sociology, psychology, and
political science that illuminates both “top-down” and “bottom-
up” factors contributing to the ideological divide concerning
climate change (see Figure 1). Although systematic research on
this topic is only a few years old, there have been important
advances. Institutional approaches emphasize the importance of
“top-down” forms of elite communication, such as those related
to corporate strategy, conservative think tanks, and mainstream
media. Behavioral approaches focus on “bottom-up” processes,
such as ego, group, and system justification motives, all of which
are capable of contributing to polarization over climate change.
We wish to point out that “top-down” and “bottom-up” factors
are compatible and very often mutually reinforcing (see also Jost
et al., 2009).
At the same time, it is clear that certain ways of framing
messages are more effective than others when it comes to encour-
aging support for climate change policies (e.g., Feygina et al.,
2010; Hardisty et al., 2010; Feinberg and Willer, 2011; Bain
et al., 2012; Campbell and Kay, 2014). Johnson (2012) has argued
that climate change communication is often ineffective because
there is too much “fear messaging” and not enough “self-efficacy
messaging,” which encourages people to feel that they possess
significant control over the situation. Fear messaging seems to
increase recipients’ needs for cognitive closure in general as well
as their affinity for conservative labels and policies (Thórisdóttir
and Jost, 2011), and conservatives tend to be more sensitive to
threatening messages in the first place (Jost et al., 2003; Hibbing
et al., 2014). Therefore, a little fear may go a long way, and it may
induce citizens to respond defensively and engage in denial and
minimization rather than facing up to environmental problems
(Feygina et al., 2010; Jost and Hennes, 2013).
Nevertheless, focusing exclusively on message framing is likely
to address proximate rather than ultimate causes of the ideological
divide, which presumably include top-down, discursive structures
as well as bottom-up, psychological functions. Few studies to date
have isolated precise causal mechanisms linking political ideology
to environmental attitudes and behaviors (but see Hennes et al.,
2014, for an experimental attempt). We hope and anticipate that
the demonstration of cause-effect relationships will become a
higher priority in future research on the psychology of climate
change. In the meantime, policy makers and concerned citizens
will need to be more attentive to and effective in managing
ideological processes and outcomes if the United States and other
leading nations are to move beyond the present stalemate over
climate change policy.
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